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S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL



SOVIET BLOC

ECONOMIC PENETRATION

OF

INDONESIA

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

30 November 1956

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S-E-C-R-E-I NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: DEC 1999



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increary and Conclusions

Indonesian trade in 1955 with the Sino-Seviet Bloe, although still a small share of the total trade, showed a sizeable increase over previous years. During the past several years the Bloc countries have made considerable efforts to increase trade and economic relations with Indonesia. These efforts have included the conclusion of trade agreements, the establishment of permanent trade missions, participation in the Djakarta International Trade Fairs and, more recently, offers of technical assistance for Indonesia's economic development. During 1956 the Bloc has intensified its efforts to develop closer relations with Indonesia. In April the Soviet Union made its first concrete proposal to give Indonesia economic assistance for development in all fields and in September a \$100,000,000 credit agreement was signed. Two agreements providing for Csech assistance were also announced in April. President Sukarno visited the Soviet Union and Communist China, Indonesia sent parliamentary missions to the USSR, Poland, Csechoslowakia and Communist China.

To date the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided Indonesia with known credits totalling \$112.3 million. Of this total, the USSR has provided \$100 million and the European Satellites \$12.3. The Soviet credit program will undoubtedly involve large shipments of capital equipment to Indonesia. Following the pattern established in India and Afghanistan, Soviet technicians will probably be sent to man the installations in their initial phase of operations and to train Indonesians in the use of the equipment.

Prior to the signature of the Soviet credit agreement in September 1956, Bloc technical assistance to Indonesia was limited to small—scale projects—the construction of a sugar refinery, a canvas-producing factory, a tire factory and an enamelware factory. Under the Soviet credit agreement, however, technical assistance will probably be extended to the large-scale development projects such as hydroelectric installations, coal-mines and the development of non-ferrous metal ore deposits all of which have been given a high priority by the Indonesian Government in its industrialization program. The Soviet mission which will begin survey work in 1957 in the above fields will be in a position to exercise considerable influence in establishing a format for their development.

The amount of Bloc credit has been small compared with the assistance Indonesia has received from the US. Total US assistance to Indonesia since 1950 has amounted to approximately \$148 million which includes a \$100 million Export-Import Bank credit extended in 1950. An agreement under Public Law 480, signed in March 1956, provides an additional sum of \$77.4 million to be used for economic development purposes.



With Indonesia's economic development severely handicapped by a lack of capital and a shortage of skilled personnel, it is apparent that Indonesia will require appreciable outside assistance if an extensive development program is to be undertaken. The Indonesian Government, in line with its neutralist policy, has indicated its willingness to receive assistance from any source provided it contains no political or military commitments. Indonesia will probably continue to seek a large share of its capital and technical assistance requirements from the Free World, but there is an increasing receptivity to Bloc offers of assistance. If the Bloc countries continue to make offers which conform to Indonesia's expressed aims, Bloc aid will continue to be accepted.



I. Foreign Trade

Sino-Soviet Bloc trade in 1951-1956, as shown in Table 1, represented an insignificant percentage of Indonesia's total trade. Indonesian trade with the Bloc countries in 1955, although still a relatively small share of total trade, showed a sizeable increase over 1954. Indonesian exports to the Bloc in 1955 totalled \$33,898,000 (3.6 percent of total exports) compared to exports in 1954 of \$9,082,000 (1.1 percent of total exports). Similarly, Indonesian imports from the Bloc in 1955 increased to \$40,366,000 (6.6 percent of total imports) from \$15,333,000 (2.4 percent of total imports) in 1954. The gradual increase in the volume of trade with the Bloc evidenced in the first half of 1955 was somewhat offset by a decrease in the second half, partially attributable to the policy of the Harahap Cabinet which restricted Czech, Polish and Hungarian imports from July to mid-December because of unfavorable trade balances. Trade statistics for the first half of 1956 (Table 1) indicate a repetition of the 1955 pattern. However, since new trade agreements are being concluded with the European satellites which require payments in "effective currence" in place of the barter arrangements used earlier, it is not now possible to ascertain whether second half 1956 trade will tend to balance imports and exports on a country-by-country basis.

Czechoslovakia, Communist China and Hungary are Indonesia's most important Bloc trading partners. Rubber, copra, pepper, coffee, cane sugar, and coconut oil are exported to the Bloc countries in exchange for light manufactures notably textiles, cement, motorcycles, and machinery.

Of Indonesia's three principal export commodities - rubber, tin and petroleum - only rubber is exported to the Bloc, although under the current bloc agreements tin is included on Indonesia's export lists. Even though rubber accounted for approximately 63 percent of total Indonesian exports to the Bloc in 1955, rubber exports to the Bloc accounted for only 5.6 percent of total Indonesian rubber exports. In 1956 low rubber exports began to evoke reactions in the Indonesian rubber producing areas. Further alarm was evoked by President Eisenhower's statement to Congress that the US could be self-sufficient in synthetic rubber production within 2 years. On 7 June 1956 an Indonesian Cabinet decision to lift the embargo on rubber shipments to Communist China was announced. Although the Bloc provides only a relatively minor market for Indonesian rubber, it is apparent that with a decline in rubber exports Indonesia will be under pressure not only to expand rubber



shipments to the Bloc countries but also, with the recent Indonesian cabinet decision, to take steps to open possibilities for the export of rubber to Communist China. In 1955 the Bloc took significant proportions of certain agricultural products, as follows: coffee, 7.5 percent; copra, 11.4 percent; sugar, 18.8 percent; spices, 38.6 percent and coconut oil, 92.4 percent.

Commodity statistics for 1955 show that textiles accounted for about half of the Bloc exports to Indonesia, while cement and semi-finished iron and steel accounted for about 10 percent each, with miscellaneous light manufactures making up most of the balance.

Bloc supplies of textiles to Indonesia increased considerably in 1955. Although the Bloc had sold only about \$5 million worth of textiles to Indonesia in 1954 (3.6 percent of total textile imports), it sold over \$17 million worth in 1955, increasing its share in this import market to 10.8 percent (see Table 2). Indonesia is highly dependent upon external sources for textiles since only 10 percent of requirements are met by domestic production.

It is worth noting too, that existing American business practices are causing US suppliers to lose out to European exporters in the textile field. American suppliers refuse to give a firm contract for goods "subject to the issuance of an import license". Local importers in Medan (commercial center in Sumatra) are turning to European firms -Czech, Hungarian, Dutch and West German - which have indicated their willingness to enter into firm delivery contracts prior to the procurement of an import license (Czech and Hungarian representatives have been particularly active in this respect). Under the Indonesian system of licensing, Indonesian import firms must, when they get an order, get quotations from their suppliers and then apply for an import license at the price and in favor of the company quoted. This process is timeconsuming and an import license, once granted, cannot be changed either in terms of price or source. If an American supplier of textiles raises the price of his goods between the time a quotation is given and an import license is secured, the Indonesia importer must apply for a new license with a resultant delay in delivery to local customers.

The Bloc is not limiting its sales in the textile field to textiles alone. Czechoslovakia provided 34.5 percent of Indonesia's imports of textile machinery in 1955. Whereas Czech sewing machines comprised only 0.4 percent of the total imported in 1954, their share increased

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to 10 percent in 1955. More overtures in this field have not come solely from Geochoslevskie. Generalist Ching in 1955 offered to provide equipment for textile wills on a long-jerm gradit besis. East Germany size has more affect of equipment, and following the 1954 Djakerts Trade Pair it denoted as automatic weaving mechine and two knitting mechines to the Textile Research Institute in Bendung.

In view of Indonesia's intended expansion of its textile industry, the Bloc may centimue to be an important supplier of equipment. In 954 Indonesia had 65 textile mills in operation and the textile industry has equipped with about 95,000 spindles, 12,000 mechanical looms, and 70,000 hand looms. In September 1955, the head of Indonesia's Textile Research Institute, Dr. Safuin, accepted an invitation to visit a Csech textile machinery exhibit. Before his departure he declared that Indonesia at that time had only 20 percent of its minimum requirements of textile machinery. The potential impact of Bloc equipment upon Indonesia's textile industry is therefore significant.





Suic-Soviet Trade Promotional Activities

The Sino-Soviet Blos countries have made considerable efforts in the past several years to promote and increase economic relations with Indonesia. These efforts have included the conclusion of trade agreements, the establishment of permanent trade offices in Djakarta, active participation in the Djakarta International Trade Fairs, and intensified advertising. Since the installation of the Ali governments, various good will trips have been made to Bloc countries by the President and delegations of members of parliament.

A. Trade Agreements with Bloc Countries

Indonesia currently (November 1956) has trade agreements with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China. There is also a special agreement between the East German Chamber of Foreign Trade and the Indonesian National Trade Organization. Expired annual agreements with Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria are being renegotiated in the so-called "new terms" calling for cash payments of charges rather than barter type cancellation of balances.

Under the Ali Government which held office from July 1953 to August 1955 government policy led to a strengthening of trade relations with the Bloc. Closer trade ties were negotiated as trade agreements were concluded for the first time with Communist China, Rumania, and East Germany. In early 1955 the Ali Government began to show disillusionment with Bloc trade: implementation under the agreements had not measured up to expectations; Indonesian products sold to the Bloc countries were being resold on the European markets at lower prices; and the Bloc, in seeking outlets in Indonesia, appeared to favor local Communist businessmen. After the Harahap Cabinet took office in August 1955 special trade patterns - the parallel transactions* formerly used extensively with Eastern Europe - were abolished. Government declarations issued in October 1955 indicated that trade arrangements with the Bloc countries had been unsatisfactory and had resulted in a general deterioration in the foreign exchange position. The Prime Minister, in a Parliamentary debate, pointed out that raw materials exported to the Bloc had been retraded in other markets in direct competition with normal Indonesian exports and that, under parallel transactions, Indonesian exports were usually sold below world market prices with the deficit made up by charging Indonesian consumers more for imports.

^{*} Under parallel transactions the commodities of one country are exchanged for commodities of the other without transfer of funds.



The Ali government, which again took office in April 1956, has indicated its dissatisfaction, first expressed in early 1955, with the existing Bloc trade arrangements. It has formulated new arrangements in which the volume quotas are revised and the systems of payment made on a new basis. Whether or not the volume of trade will be increased under new agreements, the Bloc will probably continue to maintain its present volume of trade because of established connections with Indonesian businessmen and increased Indonesian familiarity with Bloc products.

B. Permanent Trade Offices

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary have established fullfledged permanent trade missions in Indonesia, while East Germany and Rumania have had less formal representations there. One of the functions of the trade missions apparently has been to find suitable agents or outlets, preferably Indonesian, for the commodities being offered by the Bloc countries. See Appendix I for a list of local representatives handling Bloc products.

Rumanian Trade Mission - In the latter part of 1955 the Rumanian delegation to the 3rd International Trade Fair announced plans to establish a permanent trade office in Indonesia. In October 1955 this delegation, composed of technological experts, opened a permanent display of Rumanian products -- pumps, telecommunications equipment, and other machinery -- in Djakarta where demonstrations are arranged daily.

Czech Trade Mission - A Mr. Polacek has been reported as the principal officer in the Czech Trade Mission which is attached to the Consulate General in Djakarta. Other information has listed R. Razak as a Czech commercial representative attached to the Consulate General.

East German Trade Mission - Information in early 1955 reported that the members of the trade representation of the East German Chamber of Foreign Trade included Willi Schild and Kindler (fnu). The address was listed as Hotel des Indes, Djakarta, cable designation "HAVDINDO".

Polish Trade Mission - Information in July 1955 stated that the permanent Polish Commercial Mission maintained an office at Djalan Indramaju No. 9, Djakarta. In May 1956 Wlodzimierz Wink, a member of the Polish Trade Commission, was appointed Charge of the newly-established Polish Embassy in Djakarta.



Bulgarian Trade Mission - A trade mission, headed by a Mr. Gummuroff, has reopened a trade office in Djakarta.

C. Participation in the Diskarta International Trade Fairs

Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania participated in the 3rd International Trade Fair held in Djakarta from 18 August - 26 September 1955. Poland and Rumania had only information booths and East Germany exhibited through a local agent. While the Bloc countries did not dominate the Fair as they had in 1954, they nevertheless made a very impressive showing. The Czechs were the most aggressive in publicising their exhibit, running a series of ads in local newspapers about the products on display. As in the past, the Bloc countries used the Fair for major propaganda purposes, exhibiting their products in an effort to convince Indonesia they were capable of supplying Indonesian requirements for capital and consumer goods. Remarks made by some Indonesian officials and businessmen indicated that China, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had, to some extent, succeeded in establishing such a conviction.

D. <u>Intensified Advertising</u>

The Bloc countries have advertised extensively to promote sales of their products. Polish advertisements appearing in the Indonesian press have listed 14 Polish trade organisations which claim to be able to deliver a wide range of goods including heavy capital equipment, ships, and motor vehicles. The Czech Commercial representative attached to the Czech Consulate General, in an effort to interest local importers in Medan in Czech products, distributed to importers a catalogus listing a wide variety of available products. In included machinery, vehicles and light engineering products, textiles and leather goods, ceramic and glass products. A Rumanian delegation was also in Medan demonstrating agricultural machinery — a crawler tractor, a triple-gang plow, discharrows, and other farm equipment — to the employees of the Office of Agriculture in North Sumatra.

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III. Bloc Pevelopmental Assistance to Indonesia

Feonomic development has been given high priority by the Indonesian poverment, but limited financial resources have prevented a significant increase in the rate of capital investment. Private capital as failed to compensate for the low level of government investment. Covernmental milicy, conditioned by intense mationalism and directed at the "Indonesinnization" of all companies, has sought to limit the economic influence of foreign investors. Failure to develop a realistic foreign investment law to provide guarantees against nationalization, double taxation, settlement of land concession rights, and assurances that profits can be transferred abroad has discouraged reinvestment as well as new investment by foreign capital. Foreign aid programs have been restricted by Indonesian attitudes - a fear of having restrictions imposed on their sovereignty and freedom of action and a sensitivity to foreign influence. At the same time Indonesia has not had the domestic resources and economic institutions to undertake an extensive economic development program without outside assistance.

To date the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided Indonesia with known credital totalling fills, million. Of this total, the USSR has provided 100 million and the European Satellites files. The Soviet credit program will undoubtedly involve large shipments of capital equipment to Indonesia. Following the pattern established in India and Afghanistan, Soviet technicians will probably be sent to man the installations in their initial phase of operations and to train Indonesians in the use of the equipment.

Prior to the signature of the Soviet economic aid agreement in Sprender 1956, Bloc technical assistance to Indonesia was limited to small-scale projects—the construction of a sugar refinery, a canvas-producing factory, a tire factory and an enamelware factory. Under the Soviet credit a reement, however, technical assistance will probably be extended to the large-scale development or jects such as hydroelectric installations, coal-mines and the development of non-ferrous metal ore deposits all of which have been given a high priority by the Indonesian Government in its industrialization program. The Soviet mission which will begin survey work in 1957 in the above fields will be in a position to exercise considerable influence in establishing a format for their development.

Prior to 1956 Bloc assistance had been carried out by the Furopean satellites, primarily Past Germany and Csechoslovakia. It is evident that the Bloc intends to participate in Indonesia's economic development on a large-scale. The Increased Bloc aid programs are supported by Prime later III's government.





A. Fast Germany

An Fast German contract was signed in February 1955, for the construction of a sugar factory in Jogjakarta (South Java). The sugar factory will have a deposity of 2,000 tons of sugar per 2h hours with an additional distillery capacity of 1,500 tons of spirit daily. It has been reported that approximately 1,200 hectares of land (about 2,765 acres) will be planted with sugar came to supply the mill. The factory is to employ 10,000 workers. The total came grinding capacity per 2h hours of Indonesia's sugar factories is currently 67,527 tons. The Jogjaharta factory will increase total came grinding capacity per 2h hours by 3 percent.

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The sugar factory was scheduled to commence initial operations in August 1956, but only one-third of the machinery had arrived by the code of June.

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In spite of the fact that the delay may have been caused in part by the failure of Indonesia to provide adequate financing and transportation facilities for the equipment, the Fast Germans will almost certainly be blamed.

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To date there is no definite date mentioned for the completion of the sugar factory although the central government is anxious that it be completed by the end of 1957. Completion of the plant will primarily depend on the availability of domestic financing which is still questionable.

Sugar production in Indonesia has steadily increased since the mar, with 1955 production estimated at 850,000 m. t. compared with 718,000 m. t. for 1954 and 619,521 m. t. for 1953. Domestic consumption requirements have almost equalled annual production, however. The following table shows Indonesia's domestic consumption of white sugar for 1950~1955:



	Domestic Production	Percent of
Toar	Netric Tons	Production
1950	224,700	84
	121,167	98
1051	156, Loli	99
D25	518,031	80
1753		69
1054	498,301 665,18 6	78

The construction of the Fast German plant falls within the government's plans for agricultural projects, the primary purposes of which are to make Indonesia self-sufficient in food and to increase the exportation of agricultural produce in order to acquire foreign exchange.



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B. Csechoslovakia

Czech efforts to provide technical assistance for Indonesia's economic development met with very little success in 1955. Only one small-scale project, the construction of a canvas-producing factory, was undertaken with Czech assistance. A January 1955 article in Aneta, in reporting on this project, indicated most of the textile machinery had arrived and Czech technicians were assisting in the mounting and operation of the machinery.

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

However, Indonesian Economic Ministry revealed on 13 April that the Czech Government had submitted a draft credit agreement to the Indonesian Government under which credits would be granted to Indonesia for the establishment of such industries as steel, cement, textiles, glass, paper and pulp, and fertilizer. The Foreign Office has stated this was a revision of the draft on which the countries had failed to agree in July 1955. the total line of credit is not specified but that subsidiary agreements are to be reached on a project-by-project basis. The terms call for payment in sterling with 10 percent down, 15 percent on the first shipment and the balance in 9 semi-annual installments. The draft envisages the use of Czech technicians whose expenses will be paid in local currency. The agreement was signed on 16 May and the press reported the first credit under the agreement was the \$1.6 million credit to the Indonesian Tire and Rubber Company.

The credit will be used by the Indonesian Tire and Rubber Company to equip a tire factory in Djakarta. A contract for this purpose was signed between the Bank of Industry and the Czech firm, Technoexport.

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the total cost of equipment for the tire factory is Rp 50 million (\$4,386,000). Equipment valued at Rp 18 million (\$1.6 million) is scheduled to arrive in Djakarta in January 1957. The plant, scheduled to begin operations in January 1958, is to produce 600 tires per day in two sizes, 6.00 x 16 for jeeps, light trucks and

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passenger cars, and 7.50×20 for heavier trucks. The existing factory in Indonesia, operated by Goodyear, produces about 1,000 motor vehicle tires per day and supplies about 65 percent of the market.

In early 1956 Prague announced the conclusion of a second contract by Technoexport (under the Czech credit agreement) for the construction of an enamelware factory which is to turn out 750 tons of enamel utensils a year. The Czechs are to deliver the complete equipment including an electric power station. Czech technicians are to install the equipment and train Indonesian workers in the servicing of the machinery and in production methods. According to press reports, part of the enamelware factory equipment has arrived in Indonesia.

Czechoslovakia is continuing to exert considerable effort to promote the sales of its industrial products.

offer has been made to send Czech experts to train Indonesian technicians in the use of Czech industrial machinery ordered by Indonesia. Currently there are two Czech technicians working, without pay, in Modjokerto in East Java province, testing bulldozers, heavy trucks, and locomotives ordered from Czechoslovakia by the East Java Public Works Service. The equipment, valued at approximately \$780,000, will be sent to Kediri residency in south Java for use in construction work on the Brantas River flood control project and in the digging of a new irrigation canal.

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'C. Rumania



A Rumanian-Indonesian agreement of August 1954 included a provision for Rumanian assistance in the construction of a cement mill, in drilling oilwells and working mineral deposits.

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already has one cement plant in operation and construction work is progressing on a cement at Gresik, near Surabaya (East Java), which is being financed by an Export-Import Bank loan. Anticipated production of the Gresik plant, added to current production, is expected to bring local cement output close to the present demands of the domestic market. The plant at Gresik will save Indonesia approximately \$6 million per year in foreign exchange. Construction of this third plant would make Indonesia self-sufficient in cement and might even supply a surplus for export. It also would have the concomitant result of displacing Bloc exports of cement in Indonesia. Over half of Indonesia's total cement imports in the first half of 1955 were supplied by the Bloc. Of total Bloc exports of cement to Indonesia in January—June 1955 approximately 70 percent was supplied by Csachoslovakia, 23 percent by Rumania, and the remainder by Poland and Hungary.

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Indonesia's failure to establish a stable petroleum policy presents a sizable drawback for foreign investors. Under present conditions each foreign firm must make separate arrangements for concessions, taxes, and the use of foreign exchange — all of which are subject to change.

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D. The Soviet Union

Joint talks on the USSR's offer of technical and economic aid took place in Djakarta in August 1956. One stumbling block to the conclusion of the talks appeared to be the question of repayment of the loan. The Indonesians wanted repayment to begin after the project was completed, but the Soviets wanted repayment to begin when the goods were shipped. Proposals made by the Soviet delegation for some aid projects, including credit offers of \$50 to \$100 million, were consistently rejected by the Indonesians on the basis of the incomplete status of their 5-year plan.

The Soviet-Indonesian economic and technical aid agreement was signed on 15 September 1956. The agreement provided for a Soviet line of credit equivalent to \$100 million for industrial projects. The credit which will be repaid over a 12-year period at 2½ percent interest beginning 3 years after the loan has been made is payable in sterling or Indonesian raw materials. The Soviets will make experts available for research in peaceful uses of atomic energy and will train Indonesians in this field. It was announced that Soviet credits would be used for financing 11 government-operated projects in the electric power, coal, chemicals, pulp and paper, and cement industries. Separate agreements are to be concluded later for specific projects.

A Soviet mission, scheduled to be sent to Indonesia in 1957, will start preliminary surveys of the coal, nonferrous metal, hydroslectric, and industrial raw material resources.

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E. Other Bloc Countries

Both Poland and Communist China have used vague offices of technical assistance to Indonesia. The head of the Poland trade mission to Indonesia announced in November 1956 that Poland was willing to give industrial and textile manufacturing aid to Indones to 12958 34(f)(1)-25778 is studying the Polish offer,




communique on the renewal of the Communist Chinese-Indonesia: trade agreement revealed that Peiping offered to train Indonesians in the use of light industrial equipment which it would make available under the agreement.

F, Training Facilities Offered to Indonesia by the Bloc

The Bloc countries have granted a number of scholarships to Indonesianstudents for specialized studies in Communist universities. East Germany granted 15 scholarships for study at East German universities and Czechoslovakia offered 9 scholarships to Indonesian universities and Czechoslovakia offered 9 scholarships to Indonesian students. The Chairman of the Indonesian Industrial Board stated in September 1956 that since 1955 the USSR made a standing offer of 55 scholarships for technical training and 200 scholarships for industrial training at Russian universities and technical institutes. The Board is planning to send 15 students to the USSR in 1957 for industrial training. The departure in November 1956 of 23 Indonesian students for the USSR and Poland to study under scholarships was postposed due to the tense international situation.

The Indonesian Government is aware that it must overcome its shortages of trained personnel in order to successfully implement its economic development program. One of the steps the government has taken in the expansion of its educational program has been to send Indonesian adudents to colleges and graduate schools abroad.

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(Yalmes in thousands of \$08)

	to World	Yalas	5 cd Total	Value Beer	Chine
Exports					
1951	391,786	2,416	0.2	NoRo	105
1952	907,531	9,817	1.1	NoRo	27
1953	819,633	4,504	0.5	NoRo	2
1954	856,064	9,082	1.1	439	2,345
1955	931,415	33,898	3.6	N.R.	6,235
1956 Jan-Ja	408,252	13,798	3.4	N.R.	4,283
Dayon's					
1951	873,185	6,894	0.8		2,592
1952	923,953	5,309	0.6		1,943
1953	752,970	6,955	0.9	82	2,129
1954	629,099	15,333	2.4	560	3,537
1955	604,187	40,366	6.6	203	9,929
1956 Jan Ju	439,300	23,941	5.4	59-	17,428



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(Values in thousands of \$ 98)

Tear A	Denia	Bulgaria	Crechoslovakia	East Germany	Brogery	Poland	Russia
Exports							
1951 1952 1953 195% 1955 1956 Jen- June	ege ege ege ege ege ege ege ege ege ege	B.B. N.R. N.R.	956 3 134 3,758 10,648 56	nor. Nor. Nor. Nor. Nor. Nor.	107 1,633 2,748 48	1,357 9,767 4,261 631 12,621 9,411	NoRo NoRo NoRo 276 1,446 No.70
Imports							
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 Jan-		N.R. N.R. N.R.	3,069 2,707 2,804 7,766 17,363 2,887	n.R. 5 N.R. N.R. 1,093	943 323 1,592 2,570 8,271 1,676	331 312 900 2,908 707	N.R. N.R. a/ N.R. 1,692 79

a. Less than \$500

1. Data for 1956, Jan-June

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Unclassified



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TABLE 2

Indonesian Textile Imports

(Values in thousands of US \$)

January - December 1955

	Total from World		Total from Bloc		Percent
	Metric Tons	Value	Metric Tons	Value	
Silk yarns for weaving Cotton yarn and thread Yarn of syn. staple fibers Cotton fabrics, standard type Fabrics of fine animal hair, pure or mixed with tex. fibers other than silk and syn. not incl. laces, ribbons	34 19,616 13,135 53,281	159 27,672 14,951 91,835	10 237 39 8,939	50 350 179 14,361	31.4 1.3 1.2 15.6
and spec. fab. for tech. use	413	1,698	132	601	35-4
Fab. of syn. tex. fibers, standard type, not incl. sarongs, lace fab., lace					
and narrow fabrics Curtains, upholstery and	9,229	16,163	669	1,555	9.6
drapery mat., n.e.s. Lace fab., lace, trims, ribbons, and other sim.	27	83	11	22	26.5
wares, n.e.s. of cotton Spec. textile fabrics, and	119	293	9	32	10.9
related products Hsld. linens; blankets and coverlets of cotton and	7,383	8,296	145	283	3-4
of fine animal hair	1,003	646	93	87	13.5
	104,240	161,796	LO,284	17,520	10.8



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TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

(Values in thousands of US \$)

January - December 1954

	Total from World		Total f	Percent	
	Metric Tons	Value	Metric Tons	Value	
Silk yarns for weaving	92	504	24	100	19.8
Cotton yarn for weaving, single, unbleached	10,058	13,092	30	3 გ	0.3
Cotton sewing thread, other	•	-			-
than on reels and claws Cotton fabrics, stand type, not	40	116	5	4	3.4
incl. narrow and spec. fabrics Fabrics of fine animal hair, pure, or mixed with text.	58,851	107,614	2,255	4,143	3.8
fibers, other than silk or synthetic, not incl. pile, fab., laces, ribbons and					
spac. Tab. for tech. use	427	1,514	10	40	2.6
Oil-cloth and sim. fabrics except for upholstering,		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		•	
articles thereof	70	86	6	360	4.4
Ropes, cables, cord, sail twine, packing thread and fishnet Belting silk gauze, filter	2,020	1,393	ليفع	53	3.8
cloth, trans and conu. belts and sim. tex. n.e.s. used for manufacture of ind. acc.	60	166	1	3	1.8
Cotton blankets and coverlets, except carded blankets	82	67	3	4	6.0
	75,693	132,817	2,494	4,753	3.6



APENDIX I

Local Representatives for Bloe Products

Czechenlovakia

N. V. Ombilia Trading Co, Gumung Schard

Firma Sjam and Comp. Djl Hajam Wuruk 31

N. V. Ri. Perintis, Djalan Perniagaan 72

N. V. MASS, Djalan Djendral Sudirman

N. V. Alimy, Petjenongan

N. V. Hardjasari, 34 Djalan Assem Baru

N. V. Alpine, Kramat Raja 16

N. V. Imioprom, 21 Djalan Gadjah Mada

East Germany

Ichsani, Ltd., Djalan Orpa 70

Asram Incl. C. V.

Skeda and Tes machine tools

Chemapol dyestuffs and industrial chemicals

Skeda and Slavia engines

Skoda and Motokov Motor Vehicles Jawa bicycles and metorcycles . Shoe machinery, Brme

firearms

Keve printing machinery

Zeteer tractors

Chemapol Pharmaceutical Chemicals

Sole agent for sale of machinery exhibited at 3rd International Trade Fair

Sole representative for the IFA auto factory in Fast Germany

HUNGALY

Firma Autotechnicum Leidemeyer, Djalan Raja Kramat 74

N. V. Populair, Pasar Baru 93

no to reputati , reser beru ,)

Rahmay

Rumania

P. D. Horas, Djalan Djekja 12

Csepal Motorcycles

Tumgsram light bulbs and radio tubes

Sole agent for textiles

Sole agent for cement

SECRET

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APPENDIX II

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Free World Assistance and Investment (Other than U. S.)

Apart from the Netherlands loam of 1950 for \$73.7 million, assistance from other Free World countries through June 1956 had been small.

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

(S)

E0 12958

3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Failure of the Indonesian Government to provide the necessary guarantees for foreign investment—guarantees against nationalization and double taxation, settlement of land concession rights and assurances that profits can be transferred abroad—has discouraged reinvestment as well as new investment by foreign capital. The withdrawal of Dutch capital, primarily invested in rubber plantations, has been most extensive, but in 1954 British and US interests also announced their intentions of liquidating particular holdings. US petroleum interests—Standard Vacuum and Caltex—expect, however, to invest approximately \$140 million in Indonesia over the next four or five years. Monthly transfer of profits is tied to commitments of new investment of \$70-80 million by Stanvac and of \$60 million by Caltex.

On 27 April 1956 the Indonesian press announced Indonesian and Japanese governmental approval for the establishment of a joint Japanese-Indonesian National Reconstruction Bank. The bank will have a capital of 50 million rupiahs (approximately \$4.4 million), 49 percent of which will be provided by a Japanese company and 51 percent by private Indonesian investors.

EN 12958

3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

in foreign exchange transactions, but it will lend money for the development of Indonesia's petroleum industry, interisland shipping services, and other industries.

In mid-June 1956 a contract to finance machinery for a rice straw paper mill in Central Java under a four-year credit was concluded between the State Industrial Bank and an Italian firm "Celluloso Pomilio." The mill, scheduled to open by mid-1958, is to have an annual capacity of 7,500 tens. A second State Industrial Bank panjest for an asbestos cement factory near Gresik (East Java) is to have Italian technical aid and financial aid from New Zealand under the Colombo plan. New Zealand assistance has also been reported for planned tannery and glass factories. The Indonesian foreign credits committee has announced the continued opportunity for capital goods imports under long-term credits from the Netherlands, West Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the UK and the US.